

IV. Xinjiang

Findings

- During the Commission’s 2019 reporting year, authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) expanded a system of extrajudicial mass internment camps in which they continued to arbitrarily detain Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Hui, and others. Security personnel at the camps subjected detainees to torture, including beatings; electric shocks; waterboarding; medical neglect; forced ingestion of medication; sleep deprivation; extended solitary confinement; and handcuffing or shackling for prolonged periods, as well as restricted access to toilet facilities; punishment for behavior deemed religious; forced labor; overcrowding; deprivation of food; and political indoctrination. Some detainees reportedly died in camps due to poor conditions, medical neglect, or other reasons.
- Authorities forced some mass internment camp detainees to engage in labor and forced former detainees to engage in labor following their release from camps. According to research published by German researcher Adrian Zenz in July 2019, authorities began establishing forced labor programs for camp detainees and “graduates” in the second half of 2018, in addition to extensive forced labor programs for XUAR residents not detained in camps.
- Scholars and rights groups provided a strong argument, based on available evidence, that the “crimes against humanity” framework may apply to the case of mass internment camps in the XUAR. Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides a list of 11 acts that may constitute “crimes against humanity” “when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”
- Official Chinese media portrayed revised regional regulations on extremism as justification for mass internment camps, but the camps remained illegal under both Chinese and international law. In October 2018, the XUAR People’s Congress revised the region’s first anti-extremism regulations, which were adopted in March 2017, and official media described the revisions as a legal basis for “vocational training centers” combating “extremism” in the XUAR—an apparent reference to mass internment camps. International legal scholars and rights advocates stressed that, despite Chinese officials’ attempt to use the revised regulations to justify mass internment camps, the revised local legislation did not provide a legal basis for the camps, particularly because the PRC Law on Legislation only allows deprivation of personal liberty under statutes passed by the National People’s Congress or its Standing Committee.
- In November 2018, Adrian Zenz published the findings of research he conducted into budgets for security expenditures in the XUAR and other regions of China which showed that “political reeducation” carried out in mass internment camps appeared to be aimed at “political indoctrination and intimidat-

Xinjiang

tion”—refuting Chinese officials’ assertions that the purpose of mass internment camps is to provide vocational education and employment training. In October 2018, Agence France-Presse (AFP) reported that, based on its analysis of 1,500 publicly available procurement documents from local governments in the XUAR, authorities administered mass internment camps in the same way as prisons. AFP reported that government departments in charge of administering camps ordered police uniforms, riot shields and helmets, electrified batons, cattle prods, billy clubs, spears, handcuffs, pepper spray, tear gas, tasers, net guns, stun guns, and spiked clubs known as “wolf’s teeth” to maintain control over detainees.

- Mass internment camp detainees reportedly included permanent residents of the United States and Australia. American officials stated in March 2019 that Chinese authorities may have detained several American residents. As of August 2019, Chinese authorities reportedly detained ten or more Australian residents in mass internment camps. In addition, at least five Australian children were reportedly unable to leave the XUAR due to restrictions on the freedom of movement of their parents in the XUAR.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

- Call on the Chinese government to end the mass, arbitrary detention of predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities, including Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Hui, and others in mass internment camps, and release those currently detained. Call on Chinese officials to allow U.S. officials, diplomatic representatives of other countries, UN officials, humanitarian organizations, and international journalists to visit the XUAR and independently investigate reports of arbitrary detention. Coordinate with other governments and international non-governmental organizations to compile relevant information regarding specific XUAR officials responsible for the arbitrary mass detention and abuse of individuals in mass internment camps in preparation for possible sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Public Law No. 114–328).
- Support the passage of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2019 (S. 178 and H.R. 649), requiring the Director of National Intelligence and the State Department to report on issues including the regional security threats caused by Chinese government repression of ethnic minorities in the XUAR, and on the transfer or development of technologies to facilitate mass internment and surveillance there; requiring the Federal Bureau of Investigation to report on topics such as its efforts to protect ethnic Uyghurs and Chinese nationals in the U.S. from Chinese government intimidation, and those whose families in China have been threatened or detained because of their advocacy for the Uyghurs; and establishing a position known as the Special Coordinator for Xinjiang.

Xinjiang

- Urge U.S. companies selling products, providing services, conducting business, or investing in development initiatives in the XUAR to ensure that their products, services, and investment funds do not provide support for XUAR officials' arbitrary detention of ethnic minority individuals or XUAR authorities' use of technology to otherwise repress and control XUAR residents, rather than for legitimate law enforcement activities. Urge the Bureau of Industry and Security at the U.S. Department of Commerce to track the sale of equipment and technology used by Chinese security agencies and U.S. companies' sale of surveillance and crime control technology to XUAR officials, and investigate the legality of such sales according to existing U.S. Export Administration Regulations.
- Urge American universities to provide support to Uyghur, Kazakh, and Kyrgyz students at their institutions who are Chinese nationals, to ensure they are able to study in a safe environment free of threats and intimidation from Chinese government officials; to provide scholarships or other financial assistance to students whose parents or guardians have been detained in mass internment camps in the XUAR; to inquire about the well-being of Turkic Muslims who have returned to China after having studied or taught in their institutions; to hold conferences and other programs to raise awareness among students and the general public about the mass, arbitrary detention of Turkic Muslims in the XUAR; and to refrain from holding conferences or establishing programs with Chinese government entities that lend legitimacy to the mass surveillance and mass arbitrary detention programs in place in the XUAR.
- Urge Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) member states to take coordinated action to pressure the Chinese government to shut down mass internment camps and end repressive security and surveillance measures aimed at Muslim Chinese citizens, and to condemn mass internment camps and human rights abuses of Muslim Chinese citizens at OIC and other international forums.
- In bilateral and multilateral consultations with the governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, raise concerns regarding the detention of Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Uyghurs in mass internment camps in the XUAR; work with officials from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to pressure Chinese officials to release citizens and residents of these two countries from mass internment camps in the XUAR; and urge officials from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan not to deport ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, or Uyghurs to China, where they are at risk of arbitrary detention in mass internment camps and other types of political persecution.

XINJIANG

Intensified Repression in Mass Internment System

During the Commission's 2019 reporting year, authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) expanded a system of extrajudicial mass internment camps¹ in which they continued to arbitrarily detain predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities, including Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Hui, and others.² Security personnel at the camps subjected detainees to torture, including beatings;³ electric shocks;⁴ waterboarding;⁵ medical neglect;⁶ forced ingestion of medication;⁷ sleep deprivation;⁸ extended solitary confinement;⁹ and handcuffing or shackling for prolonged periods,¹⁰ as well as restricted access to toilet facilities;¹¹ punishment for behavior deemed religious;¹² forced labor;¹³ overcrowding;¹⁴ deprivation of food;¹⁵ and political indoctrination.¹⁶ Some detainees reportedly died in camps due to poor conditions, medical neglect, or other reasons.¹⁷ Deaths that occurred in mass internment camps or shortly after release from camps included the following (this list is illustrative of available reports and not exhaustive):

- Forty-year-old Uyghur **Mutellip Nurmehmet**, who earned two Master's degrees in the United States, reportedly died nine days after authorities released him from a camp.¹⁸
- Renowned Uyghur writer **Nurmuhemmet Tohti** died in May 2019 after being held in a mass internment camp from November 2018 to March 2019.¹⁹ Tohti's Canada-based relatives said the 70-year-old suffered from diabetes and heart disease.²⁰
- **Amine Qadir**, a Uyghur in her early thirties, died in a mass internment camp in early 2018. Qadir reportedly had a heart condition that was not treated by authorities at the camp where she was detained.²¹
- **Alimjan Emet**, a 22-year-old Uyghur security guard, reportedly died in a camp at an unknown date as a result of being beaten during an interrogation.²²
- **Aytursun Eli**, a 35-year-old Uyghur woman who had worked as the deputy head of a tourism company, reportedly died during a police interrogation in June 2018. It was unclear whether Eli died in a mass internment camp or at a police station.²³

In March 2019, German researcher Adrian Zenz, speaking on a panel co-hosted by the U.S. Government on the sidelines of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, said he estimated that 1.5 million Uyghurs and other Muslims in the XUAR were or had been detained in mass internment camps.²⁴ According to this estimate, nearly one in six adult Uyghurs are or have been detained in the camps.²⁵

Mass internment camps in the XUAR, though varied in size and structure, included extremely large camps such as one located in Dabancheng district, Urumqi municipality, XUAR.²⁶ Using satellite imagery, analysts estimated the camp in Dabancheng had the capacity to hold up to 130,000 detainees.²⁷ Internment camps shared common features, such as watchtowers,²⁸ barracks,²⁹ barbed wire,³⁰ and reinforced walls.³¹ Some camps were located in struc-

tures formerly used as schools, hospitals, or other existing structures,³² and some were newly constructed.³³

MASS INTERNMENT CAMPS HAVE NO BASIS IN CHINESE LAW

Official Chinese media portrayed revised regional regulations on extremism as justification for mass internment camps, but the camps remained illegal under both Chinese and international law. In October 2018, the XUAR People's Congress revised the region's first anti-extremism regulations,³⁴ which were adopted in March 2017.³⁵ and official media described the revisions as a legal basis for "vocational training centers" combating "extremism" in the XUAR—an apparent reference to mass internment camps.³⁶ Prior to the revisions,³⁷ the regulations made no mention of "vocational training centers."³⁸ International law also prohibits the mass detention taking place in mass internment camps.³⁹ For example, as discussed by Lawfare contributor Hilary Hurd, Article 1 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) prohibits the forced internment of Uyghurs "on the basis of their religious, and ethnic, identity."⁴⁰ International legal scholars and rights advocates stressed that, despite Chinese officials' attempt to use the revised regulations to justify mass internment camps, the revised local legislation did not provide a legal basis for the camps, particularly because the PRC Law on Legislation only allows deprivation of personal liberty under statutes passed by the National People's Congress (NPC) or its Standing Committee.⁴¹ At a June 2019 conference on Uyghur human rights issues, George Washington University law professor Donald Clarke emphasized that when a group of American experts engaged in a bilateral legal dialogue asked their Chinese counterparts to provide the legal basis for mass internment camps, none of the counterparts were able to provide a relevant legal basis.⁴²

CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND MASS INTERNMENT

Scholars⁴³ and rights groups⁴⁴ provided a strong argument, based on available evidence, that the "crimes against humanity" framework may apply to the case of mass internment camps in the XUAR. Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides a list of 11 acts that may constitute "crimes against humanity" "when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack."⁴⁵ The following acts, listed in the Rome Statute, may apply to the persecution of Turkic Muslims in the XUAR:

Xinjiang

Acts listed in Article 7 of the Rome Statute ⁴⁶	Possible application to the treatment of Turkic Muslims in the XUAR
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; ⁴⁷	Arbitrary, prolonged detention of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Hui, and others in mass internment camps in the XUAR since around April 2017; ⁴⁸
(f) Torture;	Security personnel in mass internment camps in the XUAR subjected detainees to widespread torture, including through the use of electric shocks and shackling people in painful positions; ⁴⁹
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in Paragraph 3 [Article 7(3) of the Rome Statute], or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph [Article 7 of the Rome Statute] or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;	Security personnel have detained a million or more Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Hui; ⁵⁰ enforced harsh, widespread restrictions on peaceful Islamic practices of XUAR residents; ⁵¹ and subjected Turkic and Muslim XUAR residents to intense surveillance, checkpoints, intimidation, and involuntary biometric data collection. ⁵²
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons.	Hundreds of intellectuals forcibly disappeared by authorities in the XUAR are among the million or more Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Hui detained in mass internment camps. ⁵³

REASONS FOR DETENTION IN MASS INTERNMENT CAMPS

Security personnel continued to detain people in mass internment camps for such reasons as engaging in “religious extremism” or having foreign connections, such as previous overseas travel or relatives living abroad.⁵⁴ Chinese laws define a wide range of peaceful religious customs as “extremism,” including the wearing of veils and having “abnormal” beards.⁵⁵ In its March 2019 white paper, the State Council Information Office said detainees in mass internment camps, whom it referred to as “trainees” in “education and training centers,” included those “who were incited, coerced or induced into participating in terrorist or extremist activities.”⁵⁶ According to the Xinjiang Victims Database, a resource created by American researcher Gene Bunin⁵⁷ that contains information on political prisoners in the XUAR,⁵⁸ as of August 15, 2019, of the detainees for whom a reason for detention had been provided, the top

three reasons were as follows: about 33 percent were detained for reasons related to religion; about 20 percent were detained in relation to having traveled abroad; and about 11 percent were detained in connection with a relative or relatives.⁵⁹

SHIFT IN OFFICIAL NARRATIVE FROM DENIAL TO DEFENSE

During this reporting year, Chinese authorities shifted the official narrative regarding mass internment camps, moving from denial of the camps' existence in early 2018⁶⁰ to a public defense of the facilities.⁶¹ Rights advocates and scholars noted that Chinese officials felt compelled to change their narrative from denial to justification, in part following criticism of the camps at an August 2018 review of China's compliance with the ICERD by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.⁶² In November 2018, during China's Universal Periodic Review by the UN Human Rights Council, Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng described the camps as a measure that was effective in preventing people from engaging in extremism and terrorism.⁶³ In March 2019, XUAR government chairperson Shohrat Zakir told NPC delegates that the camps were "like boarding schools where the students eat and live for free,"⁶⁴ and that the camps had been "effective in eliminating religious extremism."⁶⁵ In a March 2019 white paper, the State Council Information Office said the camps "fully respect and protect the customs and habits of trainees of different ethnic groups," including by "car[ing] for their mental health," and "offer[ing] psychological counseling services."⁶⁶ In addition, officials invited foreign journalists on escorted tours of mass internment camps, during which they referred to the facilities as voluntary educational institutions.⁶⁷ During one such trip, in April 2019, Bloomberg reporter Peter Martin noted that there were bars on the windows of camp dormitories, and doors that locked only from the outside.⁶⁸

On July 30, 2019, Shohrat Zakir and XUAR government vice chairperson Erkin Tuniyaz held a press conference to describe what they referred to as the success of "vocational education and training centers," telling journalists that most people had left the centers and obtained employment.⁶⁹ Research indicated authorities compelled many current and former camp detainees to engage in forced labor, but reports did not substantiate XUAR officials' claims that authorities had released the majority of camp detainees.⁷⁰ Observers, including Uyghurs living abroad whose family members were detained in camps, disputed the claims that most camp detainees had been released.⁷¹ In August 2019, the New York Times reported that the camp system continued to expand.⁷²

While Chinese officials highlighted the occupational benefits they said camp detainees obtained from vocational education and training,⁷³ official documents sometimes referred to camps as "transformation through education" centers, a term that refers to ideological transformation.⁷⁴ Chinese authorities have also used "transformation through education" efforts to "transform" Falun Gong practitioners, pressuring them to renounce their spiritual beliefs.⁷⁵ Freedom House analyst Sarah Cook stated that Chinese Communist Party and government officials who had influence on policies in the XUAR "appear[ed] to be following the anti-Falun Gong

Xinjiang

playbook,” and that some of these officials had previously overseen the “transformation” of Falun Gong practitioners.⁷⁶

Documentation of Mass Internment Camps

Information on the scope, nature, and architecture of mass internment camps, and on conditions for detainees in the camps, primarily comes from the following sources:

ANALYSIS OF CHINESE GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

Adrian Zenz’s November 2018 publication on security expenditures in the XUAR and other regions of China—research based on openly accessible official Chinese documents—illustrated that “political reeducation” carried out in mass internment camps appeared to be aimed at “political indoctrination and intimidation.”⁷⁷ Zenz’s research thus refuted official Chinese claims that the purpose of mass internment camps is to provide vocational education and employment training.⁷⁸ Specifically, Zenz analyzed information posted online by the Chinese government, including government procurement documents and construction bids for mass internment camps in the XUAR.⁷⁹ According to Zenz’s research, XUAR budgetary data showed that spending decreased on vocational training between 2016 and 2017, while spending on security-related facility construction, prisons, and detention centers increased significantly.⁸⁰

In October 2018, Agence France-Presse (AFP) reported that, based on its analysis of 1,500 publicly available procurement documents from local governments in the XUAR, authorities administered mass internment camps in the same way as prisons.⁸¹ AFP reported that government departments in charge of administering camps ordered police uniforms, riot shields and helmets, electrified batons, cattle prods, billy clubs, spears, handcuffs, pepper spray, tear gas, tasers, net guns, stun guns, and spiked clubs known as “wolf’s teeth” to maintain control over detainees.⁸² In addition, AFP discovered orders for advanced surveillance systems, surveillance cameras, razor wire, a telephone eavesdropping system, and infrared monitoring equipment.⁸³

TESTIMONIES FROM CAMP SURVIVORS AND FAMILY MEMBERS

In the past reporting year, Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and rights advocates living outside of China have documented cases of detention in XUAR mass internment camps, including by sharing detention information online and speaking with international media. In testimony presented at a U.S. Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee hearing in April 2019, Uyghur-American rights advocate Rushan Abbas said “[a]lmost every Uyghur in the U.S. has friends and family detained—sometimes dozens and dozens of family members detained.”⁸⁴ Abbas said Chinese authorities detained her sister and her aunt in China in retaliation for her participation in a September 2018 panel on repression in the XUAR that took place at a think tank in Washington, DC.⁸⁵ According to rights advocates, fear of Chinese official retaliation against their family members or friends prevented many Uyghurs and Kazakhs living outside of China from publicizing the cases of camp detainees, but over the

Xinjiang

past year, they have spoken out in increasing numbers.⁸⁶ Radio Free Asia Uyghur Service journalists continued to publicize the detention of their own family members in the XUAR, which they viewed as retaliation for their reporting on rights abuses.⁸⁷

Online forums have provided overseas Uyghurs and Kazakhs with opportunities to document the cases of internment camp detainees. Many Uyghurs and Kazakhs began to publicize the cases of their detained relatives and friends in February 2019, after the Turkish Foreign Ministry criticized mass internment camps and mourned the reported death of Uyghur musician Abdurehim Heyit⁸⁸ in one of the camps.⁸⁹ The day after the Turkish Foreign Ministry released its statement, an official Chinese media organization released a video of Heyit, showing that he was alive.⁹⁰ The video's release prompted many Uyghurs and Kazakhs living outside of China to post online videos, pictures, and information about missing family members, including some posts that linked to a social media campaign using the hashtag “#MeTooUyghur,” in which they asked Chinese authorities to release video of their detained relatives in order to prove they were still alive.⁹¹ Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and rights advocates have also compiled information on thousands of political prisoners in mass internment camps and other facilities in the online Xinjiang Victims Database, which represents a small proportion of the total number of camp detainees in the XUAR.⁹²

INTERNATIONAL MEDIA REPORTS

International media documented the size of mass internment camps, as well as the security features in place in and around the camps, by traveling to camp sites throughout the XUAR. Journalists from Reuters,⁹³ BBC,⁹⁴ and the Globe and Mail⁹⁵ independently traveled to camps throughout the XUAR to document their existence. Journalists from international media also interviewed former internment camp detainees and their family members to document their experiences.⁹⁶ For example, a Washington Post contributor interviewed the wife of ethnic Kazakh Chinese national Zharqynbek Otan, who returned to Kazakhstan after authorities detained him in a camp and other detention facilities in the XUAR for nearly two years.⁹⁷ After his release, Otan, 31 years old, reportedly had problems with his memory and difficulty recognizing his family members.⁹⁸

DETENTIONS OF FOREIGN RESIDENTS

Mass internment camp detainees reportedly included permanent residents of the United States and Australia. American officials stated in March 2019 that Chinese authorities may have detained several American residents, including the father of a man living in California.⁹⁹ As of August 2019, Chinese authorities reportedly detained ten or more Australian residents in mass internment camps.¹⁰⁰ In addition, at least five Australian children were reportedly unable to leave the XUAR due to restrictions on the freedom of movement of their parents in the XUAR.¹⁰¹

Xinjiang

ANALYSIS OF SATELLITE IMAGES

In November 2018, the International Cyber Policy Centre of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute released a report with research based on analysis of satellite imagery, as well as existing scholarly research, news reports, and other sources, which documented the recent expansion of both individual mass internment camps and the camp system as a whole.¹⁰² According to the Centre's report, which contained analysis of 28 camp locations in the XUAR, these camps increased in size by 465 percent from early 2016 to the quarter ending in September 2018.¹⁰³ The report determined that the facilities being constructed "appear intended for permanent use."¹⁰⁴

Additional satellite imagery analysis showed rapid growth in the size and scope of camp facilities. In November 2018, Reuters published a report based on analysis of satellite images it conducted together with Earthrise Media, finding that the size of 39 camps they chose to analyze had nearly tripled between April 2017 and August 2018.¹⁰⁵ In October 2018, BBC published the findings of satellite imagery analysis it conducted with aerospace company GMV, concluding that the recent trend in camp construction was towards building larger facilities.¹⁰⁶

Forced Labor in Mass Internment Camps

According to international media reports, authorities forced some mass internment camp detainees to engage in labor, and forced former detainees to engage in labor following their release from camps. According to research published by Adrian Zenz in July 2019, authorities began establishing forced labor programs for camp detainees and "graduates" in the second half of 2018.¹⁰⁷ At the same time, according to Zenz's research, officials implemented extensive forced labor programs that involved sending rural residents not detained in camps to centralized training and employment, as well as programs in "satellite factories" located in villages in which rural, mainly female, residents, were forced to work.¹⁰⁸ Government authorities provided subsidies to companies for each current or former camp worker they trained and employed.¹⁰⁹ Companies from provinces and municipalities in eastern China also employed forced labor in the XUAR, including in mass internment camps, through a continuing "pairing assistance" program.¹¹⁰ Zenz wrote that, since camp detainees have been forced to labor alongside others that have not been detained in camps, "it will soon become impossible to clearly determine whether a labor-intensive manufacturing product in Xinjiang will be made with labor from former detainees or not."¹¹¹

U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials investigated reports of forced labor products manufactured in a mass internment camp being sold in the United States after the Associated Press reported that an American sportswear company had imported such products.¹¹² Authorities in Ili (Yili) Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture reportedly sent some former camp detainees back to an internment camp after they refused the terms of their forced labor in a factory.¹¹³ [For more information on forced labor in the XUAR, see

Section II—Human Trafficking and Section II—Business and Human Rights.]

Transfer of Camp Detainees to Facilities Outside of the XUAR

Reports emerged that authorities transferred some detainees from mass internment camps in the XUAR to detention facilities in other parts of China, due to factors including overcrowding in camps within the XUAR and authorities' desire to conceal information on camp detainees.¹¹⁴ Authorities reportedly carried out transfers in strict secrecy, including through using “sealed railway carriages,” covering the windows of vehicles transporting detainees, and blocking off roads used to transport detainees.¹¹⁵ Radio Free Asia reported that authorities transferred detainees to prisons in Heilongjiang province;¹¹⁶ Gansu province;¹¹⁷ Shaanxi province;¹¹⁸ Sichuan province;¹¹⁹ Shandong province;¹²⁰ and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.¹²¹ Authorities also reportedly transferred camp detainees to other locations within the XUAR due to concerns over existing relationships of camp employees to detainees.¹²² On September 26, 2018, state media reported that ticket sales for the regional rail system would be suspended for trains departing on October 22 and later.¹²³ Australian scholar James Leibold speculated that authorities were transferring camp detainees in part in order to prevent human rights monitors from being able to track what had happened to them.¹²⁴

Detentions of Leading Turkic Cultural and Intellectual Figures

As in the previous reporting year,¹²⁵ officials continued to detain leading Turkic intellectuals and cultural figures, including Uyghur, Kazakh, and Kyrgyz scholars, musicians, writers, and journalists, in mass internment camps and other facilities.¹²⁶ According to an American scholar and rights advocate, Chinese officials have attempted to “undermine Uyghur scholarly achievement and leadership through indoctrination and terrorization of intellectuals.”¹²⁷

In May 2019, the U.S.-based organization Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP) reported the detention or disappearance of at least 435 intellectuals since early 2017 in the XUAR, stating that the cases it had documented were “likely a small portion of those persecuted,” given the lack of transparency in the region and the severe consequences to individuals providing information about such cases.¹²⁸ UHRP cited University of Washington anthropologist Darren Byler, who said Chinese authorities had focused on public figures “working in speech or text-oriented mediums,” in part because “the reeducation campaign specifically targets public figures who have significant influence.”¹²⁹

Xinjiang

Detentions of Leading Turkic Cultural and Intellectual Figures—Continued

The detentions of Tashpolat Teyip¹³⁰ and Sanubar Tursun¹³¹ are illustrative of Chinese authorities' targeting of leading cultural figures in the XUAR. According to reports published during this reporting year, an unidentified court reportedly sentenced Teyip, the president of Xinjiang University, to death with a two-year reprieve sometime after he disappeared in March 2017.¹³² Authorities reportedly accused Teyip, who received an honorary doctoral degree from the École Pratique des Hautes Études in Paris in 2008, of being a “separatist” and “two-faced.”¹³³ In the case of Uyghur musician Sanubar Tursun, an international artistic expression advocacy organization reported in February 2019 that authorities may have detained her in a mass internment camp in the XUAR, and cited unconfirmed information that authorities may have sentenced her to five years in prison.¹³⁴ In November 2018, organizers canceled concerts she had been scheduled to perform in France in February 2019, after her international contacts could no longer reach her.¹³⁵

Additional representative cases of detained Uyghur cultural and intellectual figures are as follows: Uyghur medical scholar Halmurat Ghopur;¹³⁶ Uyghur comedian Adil Mijit;¹³⁷ Uyghur singer Zahirshah Ablimit;¹³⁸ Uyghur journal editor Qurban Mamut;¹³⁹ Uyghur education official Satar Sawut;¹⁴⁰ Uyghur editor and writer Yalqun Rozi;¹⁴¹ and retired Uyghur professor Mutellip Sidiq Qahiri.¹⁴²

Detentions of Kazakhs and Kyrgyz; Documentation in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan of XUAR Mass Internment Camps

XUAR authorities continued to detain ethnic Kazakhs in mass internment camps, including some who held permanent residency status in Kazakhstan, sometimes after officials requested that they return to the XUAR from Kazakhstan.¹⁴³ XUAR authorities detained at least one Kazakh citizen who was born in Kazakhstan, Gulbahar Jelilova, in a mass internment camp.¹⁴⁴ Authorities detained Jelilova, an ethnic Uyghur businesswoman, in May 2017, in Urumqi municipality, and held her in custody for one year and three months after confiscating her Kazakh passport and issuing her a Chinese identification document.¹⁴⁵ In December 2018, Kazakhstan's Foreign Ministry reported that Chinese officials had agreed to allow 2,500 ethnic Kazakhs in China to forfeit their Chinese citizenship and go to Kazakhstan, but details of the move were unclear.¹⁴⁶ In March 2019, Kazakhstan's Foreign Ministry said Chinese authorities had released 20 Kazakh citizens out of a total of 33 held in mass internment camps.¹⁴⁷ Nevertheless, this past year, Kazakhstan authorities repeatedly denied asylum to Chinese citizen Sayragul Sauytbay, an ethnic Kazakh, who fled China in April 2018 after Chinese authorities compelled her to work in a mass internment camp.¹⁴⁸ In June 2019, Sauytbay, her husband, and her children flew to Sweden on an alien's passport issued by Swedish authorities.¹⁴⁹

Kazakhs in Kazakhstan with family members detained in camps in the XUAR increasingly publicized their cases, through social media and online videos, often in cooperation with the Almaty-

based organization Atajurt Kazakh Human Rights (“Atajurt”).¹⁵⁰ In March 2019, Kazakhstan authorities detained Atajurt head Serikzhan Bilash on charges of “inciting ethnic hatred” and raided Atajurt’s offices, removing equipment used to videotape detention testimonies.¹⁵¹ In August 2019, a court in Almaty, Kazakhstan, freed Bilash from detention according to the terms of a plea agreement that reportedly required him to curtail his rights advocacy activities.¹⁵²

Rights advocates in Kyrgyzstan also began documenting the cases of detained ethnic Kyrgyz, including university students whom Chinese authorities detained when the students returned to China after studying in Kyrgyzstan.¹⁵³

Forcible Displacement of the Children of Camp Detainees

Authorities have reportedly placed the children of mass internment camp detainees in the XUAR in orphanages, welfare centers, and boarding schools, often despite the willingness of other relatives to care for the children, raising concerns of forcible assimilation.¹⁵⁴ In 2017, authorities developed a strategy to invest billions of yuan in childcare and boarding school facilities in the XUAR, and the creation of these facilities largely coincided with the establishment of the mass internment camp system in the region.¹⁵⁵ Orphanages, boarding schools, and other full- and part-time childcare facilities in the XUAR house children with one or both parents in internment or another form of detention or forced labor, and provide care for children as young as several months old.¹⁵⁶ Reports suggested the number of displaced children is high: between January 2017 and September 2018, the XUAR government reportedly invested over US\$30 million in 45 new orphanages.¹⁵⁷ In 2017, a county in Kashgar prefecture built 18 new orphanages,¹⁵⁸ and authorities oversaw the regionwide building and renovation of 4,300 “bilingual” kindergartens, some of which board students.¹⁵⁹ In 2018, Uyghurs in Turkey,¹⁶⁰ Kazakhstan,¹⁶¹ and the U.S.¹⁶² began reporting the possible disappearance and institutionalization of child relatives, including several non-Chinese citizens. A human rights organization expressed concern that authorities’ displacement of minority children from family homes into state-run institutions, where orphans have long been raised according to Han Chinese cultural norms,¹⁶³ represented an attempt by the government to forcibly assimilate Uyghurs.¹⁶⁴

Intrusive Homestay Programs

Authorities continued to assign cadres and government workers, usually of Han ethnicity, to live with ethnic minority families in their homes for certain periods of time to gather information that was used, in some cases, to send their hosts to mass internment camps.¹⁶⁵ According to official media, as of September 2018, regional officials and other government employees had made more than 49 million visits to ethnic minority residents since the “pairing relatives” (*jiedui renqin*) or “pairing and assistance” (*jiedui bangfu* or *jiedui fubang*) program began in the fall of 2016.¹⁶⁶ Government workers are reportedly eligible for promotions if they volunteer to take part in a homestay program to monitor ethnic mi-

Xinjiang

nority families and teach them about Communist Party policies.¹⁶⁷ According to an in-depth report by Darren Byler, government workers who refused to take part in homestay programs could lose their jobs.¹⁶⁸ Under such programs, workers, referred to as “big brothers” and “big sisters,” watch their host families for signs that their practice of Islam is too “extreme.” Signs of a host family’s “extremism” might include possession of the Quran; having an acquaintance who lives abroad; and an unwillingness to drink alcohol.¹⁶⁹ Visiting cadres were authorized to ask children in the family for information if they felt other family members were evading their questions.¹⁷⁰ The cadres then used the information they compiled to decide whether to recommend that authorities should send members of their host families to a mass internment camp.¹⁷¹

Repressive Surveillance Technology and Security Measures

During this reporting year, XUAR government authorities continued to use surveillance technology and other measures to tighten state control over ethnic minority groups in the region, and to identify individuals to detain in mass internment camps.¹⁷² A report published by Human Rights Watch in May 2019 documented authorities’ continued use of a centralized system known as the “Integrated Joint Operations Platform” (IJOP) to compile and analyze information collected through mass surveillance mechanisms in the XUAR and to detect “abnormal” behaviors, targeting individuals for detention in camps or other types of restriction on movement.¹⁷³ In February 2019, Dutch cybersecurity researcher Victor Gevers discovered an online database run by the Chinese facial recognition company SenseNets that compiled real-time information on the movements of more than 2.5 million individuals in the XUAR, recording more than 6.7 million coordinates in a 24-hour period.¹⁷⁴ Gevers consequently asserted that the database was used to surveil Uyghur Muslims.¹⁷⁵ According to international media reports, SenseTime, which set up SenseNets together with Chinese firm NetPosa Technologies in 2015, helped establish a “smart policing” venture in the XUAR, and counted American and other companies among its investors.¹⁷⁶ [For more information on surveillance measures and foreign commercial investment in repressive security technology in the XUAR, see Section II—Business and Human Rights.]

Freedom of Religion

During the reporting year, the head of the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front Work Department, You Quan, and XUAR Party Secretary Chen Quanguo both emphasized the need to “sinicize” religion and resist “religious extremism” in the XUAR under the direction of the Party.¹⁷⁷ Chinese officials justified measures to repress Islamic religious faith and Muslim cultural identity, often by invoking “sinicization” and “anti-extremism” arguments.¹⁷⁸ These measures included:

- Restrictions on religious ceremonies, including funerals and burial practices;¹⁷⁹
- The confiscation and destruction of religious books and prayer mats;¹⁸⁰

Xinjiang

- The policing of commonly used religiously inflected phrases such as “assalamu alaykum”;¹⁸¹
- Cracking down on halal products and their designation;¹⁸² and
- Forcing some Muslims to drink alcohol and eat pork, in violation of their religious beliefs.¹⁸³

Throughout the XUAR, government and Party officials also enforced the physical destruction and closure of mosques, as well as policies restricting and deterring mosque attendance.¹⁸⁴ In May 2019, the Guardian newspaper released the findings of research it had conducted with the journalism site Bellingcat, using satellite imagery analysis, reporting that 15 mosques and Islamic shrines out of 91 sites analyzed had been destroyed or nearly destroyed between 2016 and 2018.¹⁸⁵ Of the sites analyzed, the Guardian and Bellingcat also found that 31 mosques and 2 major shrines, including the prominent Keriya Heytgah Mosque in Hotan prefecture, XUAR, had suffered significant structural damage.¹⁸⁶ Scholars and journalists reported that mosques throughout the XUAR were empty of worshipers and featured security cameras, razor wire, and security guards at entrances who were responsible for checking visitors’ identity documents.¹⁸⁷

Officials throughout the XUAR detained Turkic Muslims in mass internment camps for religious reasons. Examples of such individuals whose detentions were reported in the past year included an 80-year-old man detained in a camp for one year reportedly in part because “he was a Muslim who had a beard”;¹⁸⁸ an 87-year-old man detained in a camp because he could read the Quran;¹⁸⁹ a woman detained in a camp and a prison for studying Islam at an Egyptian university;¹⁹⁰ and a man in his twenties whom authorities detained in a camp and then sentenced to 15 years in prison for posting information and photos about Islam on the messaging service WeChat.¹⁹¹ Authorities reportedly sentenced well-known Uyghur businessman Abdughappar Abdurusul to death, possibly for making an unsanctioned Islamic pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia.¹⁹²

As in previous reporting years,¹⁹³ XUAR officials reportedly imposed controls on Muslims’ observance of Ramadan. Turkic Muslim residents of the XUAR faced restrictions on fasting,¹⁹⁴ mosque attendance,¹⁹⁵ and the exchange of Islamic greetings.¹⁹⁶ Authorities reportedly forced some Muslim civil servants and students to eat lunch during Ramadan¹⁹⁷ and forced some Uyghur Muslims to eat pork in spite of their Muslim faith.¹⁹⁸

Notes to Section IV—Xinjiang

¹Rob Taylor, “China Supersizes Internment Camps in Xinjiang Despite International Criticism,” *Wall Street Journal*, November 1, 2018; Fergus Ryan, Danielle Cave, and Nathan Ruser, “Mapping Xinjiang’s ‘Re-education’ Camps,” International Cyber Policy Centre, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, November 1, 2018.

²See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, “China’s Algorithms of Repression,” May 1, 2019; Reid Standish and Aigerim Toleukhanova, “Kazakhs Won’t Be Silenced on China’s Internment Camps,” *Foreign Policy*, March 4, 2019; Gene A. Bunin, “Kyrgyz Students Vanish into Xinjiang’s Maw,” *Foreign Policy*, March 31, 2019; Reid Standish, “China’s Expanding War on Islam: Now They’re Coming for the Kazakhs,” *Washington Post*, March 1, 2019; “China’s Kazakh Ambassador Angrily Rejects Xinjiang Crackdown Allegations,” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, May 28, 2019.

³Reid Standish and Aigerim Toleukhanova, “Kazakhs Won’t Be Silenced on China’s Internment Camps,” *Foreign Policy*, March 4, 2019.

⁴Nathan VanderKlippe, “‘I Felt Like a Slave’: Inside China’s Complex System of Incarceration and Control of Minorities,” *Globe and Mail*, March 31, 2019.

⁵Reid Standish and Aigerim Toleukhanova, “Kazakhs Won’t Be Silenced on China’s Internment Camps,” *Foreign Policy*, March 4, 2019; James Millward, “‘Reeducating’ Xinjiang’s Muslims,” *New York Review of Books*, February 7, 2019.

⁶Interview: ‘I Did Not Believe I Would Leave Prison in China Alive,’” *Radio Free Asia*, November 1, 2018.

⁷Flint Duxfield and Ian Burrows, “Uyghur Woman Details Life Inside Chinese ‘Re-education Camp’ in Xinjiang,” *Australian Broadcasting Corporation*, January 8, 2019.

⁸Mustafa Akyol, “China’s Gulag for Muslims,” *New York Times*, January 2, 2019.

⁹James Millward, “‘Reeducating’ Xinjiang’s Muslims,” *New York Review of Books*, February 7, 2019; Mustafa Akyol, “China’s Gulag for Muslims,” *New York Times*, January 2, 2019. For more information on extended solitary confinement in mass internment camps, see, e.g., Gerry Shih, “China’s Mass Indoctrination Camps Evoke Cultural Revolution,” *Associated Press*, May 18, 2018.

¹⁰Nathan VanderKlippe, “‘I Felt Like a Slave’: Inside China’s Complex System of Incarceration and Control of Minorities,” *Globe and Mail*, March 31, 2019.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Martha Mendoza and Yanan Wang, “US Reviews Report of Imports from Forced Labor in China Camp,” *Associated Press*, December 19, 2018; Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy, “China’s Detention Camps for Muslims Turn to Forced Labor,” *New York Times*, December 16, 2018.

¹⁴James Millward, “‘Reeducating’ Xinjiang’s Muslims,” *New York Review of Books*, February 7, 2019; “‘I Dream About the Suffering in the Camp Most of the Time Now,’” *Radio Free Asia*, January 30, 2019.

¹⁵Darren Byler, “‘As If You’ve Spent Your Whole Life in Prison’: Starving and Subdued in Xinjiang Detention Centers,” *SupChina*, December 5, 2018.

¹⁶Human Rights Watch, “China’s Algorithms of Repression,” May 1, 2019; Ryan Mac, Rosalind Adams, and Megha Rajagopalan, “US Universities and Retirees Are Funding the Technology Behind China’s Surveillance State,” *BuzzFeed News*, June 5, 2019.

¹⁷See, e.g., “Uyghur Businessman Dies While Detained in Xinjiang Political ‘Re-education Camp,’” *Radio Free Asia*, January 28, 2019; “Young Uyghur Woman Dies in Detention in Xinjiang Political ‘Re-education Camp,’” *Radio Free Asia*, September 25, 2018; “Oppression of Uyghurs in China Only ‘Gives Rise to Hatred,’ Say Their Families in Japan,” *Sankei Shimbun*, translated in *JapanForward*, October 26, 2018; “Interview: ‘I Did Not Believe I Would Leave Prison in China Alive,’” *Radio Free Asia*, November 1, 2018; “Xinjiang Authorities Sentence Uyghur Philanthropist to Death for Unsanctioned Hajj,” *Radio Free Asia*, November 21, 2018; “Uyghur Businessman Dies Following Heart Attack in Xinjiang Political ‘Re-education Camp,’” *Radio Free Asia*, April 18, 2019; Nathan VanderKlippe, “Inside China’s Campaign against the Uyghurs,” *Globe and Mail*, November 5, 2018.

¹⁸Uyghur Human Rights Project, “The Persecution of the Intellectuals in the Uyghur Region Continues,” January 28, 2019.

¹⁹Asim Kashgarian, “Prominent Uighur Writer Dies at Chinese Internment Camp,” *Voice of America*, June 14, 2019; “Prominent Uyghur Writer Dies After Being Deprived Treatment in Xinjiang Internment Camp,” *Radio Free Asia*, June 17, 2019.

²⁰Asim Kashgarian, “Prominent Uighur Writer Dies at Chinese Internment Camp,” *Voice of America*, June 14, 2019; Alison Flood, “Uighur Author Dies Following Detention in Chinese ‘Re-Education’ Camp,” *Guardian*, June 19, 2019.

²¹“Young Uyghur Woman Dies in Detention in Xinjiang Political ‘Re-education Camp,’” *Radio Free Asia*, September 25, 2018. For more information on Amine Qadir, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00405.

²²“Uyghur Man Dies in Xinjiang Internment Camp After Sacking Over Muslim Prayers,” *Radio Free Asia*, July 15, 2019.

²³“Young Uyghur Tour Director Dies Under Questioning by Xinjiang Authorities: Mother,” *Radio Free Asia*, June 24, 2019.

²⁴Stephanie Nebhay, “1.5 Million Muslims Could Be Detained in China’s Xinjiang: Academic,” *Reuters*, March 13, 2019; Nick Cumming-Bruce, “U.S. Steps Up Criticism of China for Detentions in Xinjiang,” *New York Times*, March 13, 2019.

²⁵Stephanie Nebhay, “1.5 Million Muslims Could Be Detained in China’s Xinjiang: Academic,” *Reuters*, March 13, 2019. See also “One in Six Uyghurs Held in Political ‘Re-Education Camps’ in Xinjiang’s Onsu County,” *Radio Free Asia*, August 31, 2018.

²⁶John Sudworth, “China’s Hidden Camps,” *BBC*, October 25, 2018; Philip Wen and Olzhas Aueyzov, “Tracking China’s Muslim Gulag,” *Reuters*, November 29, 2018.

Xinjiang

- ²⁷ John Sudworth, “China’s Hidden Camps,” *BBC*, October 25, 2018.
- ²⁸ John Sudworth, “China’s Hidden Camps,” *BBC*, October 25, 2018; Philip Wen and Olzhas Aueyzov, “Tracking China’s Muslim Gulag,” *Reuters*, November 29, 2018.
- ²⁹ “An Internment Camp for 10 Million Uyghurs: Meduza Visits China’s Dystopian Police State,” *Meduza*, October 1, 2018.
- ³⁰ Philip Wen and Olzhas Aueyzov, “Tracking China’s Muslim Gulag,” *Reuters*, November 29, 2018; Sean R. Roberts, “Fear and Loathing in Xinjiang: Ethnic Cleansing in the 21st Century,” *Fair Observer*, December 17, 2018.
- ³¹ Fergus Ryan, Danielle Cave, and Nathan Ruser, “Mapping Xinjiang’s ‘Re-education’ Camps,” International Cyber Policy Centre, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, November 1, 2018.
- ³² Mark Doman, Stephen Hutcheon, Dylan Welch, and Kyle Taylor, “China’s Frontier of Fear,” *Australian Broadcasting Corporation*, November 1, 2018; Nathan VanderKlippe, “‘I Felt Like a Slave’: Inside China’s Complex System of Incarceration and Control of Minorities,” *Globe and Mail*, March 31, 2019; Fergus Ryan, Danielle Cave, and Nathan Ruser, “Mapping Xinjiang’s ‘Re-education’ Camps,” International Cyber Policy Centre, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, November 1, 2018; Philip Wen and Olzhas Aueyzov, “Tracking China’s Muslim Gulag,” *Reuters*, November 29, 2018.
- ³³ Philip Wen and Olzhas Aueyzov, “Tracking China’s Muslim Gulag,” *Reuters*, November 29, 2018; Lily Kuo, “If You Enter a Camp, You Never Come Out: Inside China’s War on Islam,” *Guardian*, January 11, 2019.
- ³⁴ Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region People’s Congress Standing Committee, *Xinjiang Weiwu’er Zizhi Qu Jiduanhua Tiaoli* [Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Anti-Extremism Regulations], passed March 29, 2017, amended and effective October 9, 2018; “Xinjiang Rolls Out China’s First Law to Purge Religious Extremism,” *Xinhua*, March 30, 2017.
- ³⁵ Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region People’s Congress Standing Committee, *Xinjiang Weiwu’er Zizhi Qu Jiduanhua Tiaoli* [Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Anti-Extremism Regulations], passed March 29, 2017, effective April 1, 2017; “Xinjiang Rolls Out China’s First Law to Purge Religious Extremism,” *Xinhua*, March 30, 2017. See also CECC, *2017 Annual Report*, October 5, 2017, 286.
- ³⁶ Liu Caiyu and Liu Xuanzun, “Xinjiang Revises Its Anti-Extremism Regulation,” *Global Times*, October 10, 2018; Cui Jia, “Xinjiang Fighting Extremist Thought,” *China Daily*, October 12, 2018.
- ³⁷ Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region People’s Congress Standing Committee, *Xinjiang Weiwu’er Zizhi Qu Jiduanhua Tiaoli* [Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Anti-Extremism Regulations], passed March 29, 2017, amended and effective October 9, 2018, arts. 14, 17, 21, 33.
- ³⁸ Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region People’s Congress Standing Committee, *Xinjiang Weiwu’er Zizhi Qu Jiduanhua Tiaoli* [Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Anti-Extremism Regulations], passed March 29, 2017, effective April 1, 2017. See also Jeremy Daum, “Explainer on Xinjiang Regulations,” *China Law Translate*, October 11, 2018. Daum’s analysis includes a chart titled “Decision to Revise the ‘Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on De-extremification,’” which juxtaposes provisions in the 2017 version of the regulations with changes in the 2018 revised version.
- ³⁹ International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of December 2, 1965, entry into force January 4, 1969, art. 1; United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, 2, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, accessed June 16, 2019. The Chinese government acceded to ICERD on December 29, 1981. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 1976; United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, accessed June 16, 2019. China signed and ratified the ICESCR. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180 of December 18, 1979, entry into force September 3, 1981, arts. 7, 24. United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, accessed June 16, 2019. China signed CEDAW on July 17, 1980, and ratified it on November 4, 1980, thereby committing to undertake the legal rights and obligations contained in these articles. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 39/46 of December 10, 1984, entry into force June 26, 1987. United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, accessed June 16, 2019. China signed the CAT on December 12, 1986, and ratified it on October 4, 1988. See also Hilary Hurd, “China’s Human Rights Abuses Against Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” *Lawfare* (blog), October 9, 2018.
- ⁴⁰ Hilary Hurd, “China’s Human Rights Abuses Against Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” *Lawfare* (blog), October 9, 2018; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of December 2, 1965, entry into force January 4, 1969, art. 1.
- ⁴¹ Donald Clarke, “No, New Xinjiang Legislation Does Not Legalize Detention Centers,” *Lawfare* (blog), October 11, 2018; Jeremy Daum, “Explainer on Xinjiang Regulations,” *China Law Translate*, October 11, 2018; Jeremy Goldkorn, “China Explicitly Acknowledges, Tries to Justify Concentration Camps in Xinjiang,” *SupChina*, October 10, 2018; Nectar Gan and Mimi Lau, “China Changes Law to Recognise ‘Re-education Camps’ in Xinjiang,” *South China Morning Post*, October 13, 2018; Eva Dou, “China Acknowledges Re-Education Centers for Uyghurs,” *Wall Street Journal*, October 10, 2018. See also *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lifu Fa* [PRC Legislation Law], passed March 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000, amended March 15, 2015, arts.

Xinjiang

7, 8, 9; “New Law Aims to Justify Xinjiang Camps amid Rising U.S. Concerns,” *China Digital Times*, October 10, 2018.

⁴²World Uyghur Congress (@UyghurCongress), “A group of Chinese experts legal experts were asked 4 weeks in advance . . .,” Twitter, June 6, 2019, 6:04 p.m.

⁴³Kevin Carrico and Jerome A. Cohen, “Muslims in Xinjiang Are Facing Human Rights Abuses: Time for China Scholars to Break the Silence,” letter to the editor, *South China Morning Post*, September 20, 2018; Kate Cronin-Furman, “China Has Chosen Cultural Genocide in Xinjiang—For Now,” *Foreign Policy*, September 19, 2018; “Kate Cronin-Furman: Overview,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, September 19, 2018; Daniel Bessner and Isaac Stone Fish, “How the Left Should Respond to Ethnic Cleansing in China,” *Nation*, January 15, 2019; Michael Caster, “At Davos, the Message of ‘Globalization 4.0’ Must Include a Rebuke of China’s Ethnic Cleansing in Xinjiang,” *Hong Kong Free Press*, January 21, 2019; Sarah Cook, “A Different Kind of Prison: Mass Surveillance in Xinjiang and Its Global Implications” [Transcript], Center for Strategic & International Studies, June 28, 2019; Freedom House, “Sarah Cook: Senior Research Analyst for East Asia,” accessed August 12, 2019.

⁴⁴Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “The Persecution of the Uighurs and Potential Crimes Against Humanity in China,” April 2019; International Service for Human Rights, “HRC41—23 States Jointly Condemn China’s Suppression of Minorities in Xinjiang,” July 11, 2019; Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Universal Children’s Day 2018: China Must Reunite Uyghur Children and Parents. Forcible Placement of Children of Living Parents in State-Run Facilities Constitutes a Crime Against Humanity,” November 19, 2018. See also Rushan Abbas, “I’ve Fought China’s Slow-Motion Genocide of Uighur Muslims. Now, My Family Are Victims,” *USA Today*, May 9, 2019.

⁴⁵Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court of July 17, 1998, entry into force July 1 2002, art. 7; United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter XVIII, Penal Matters, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, accessed June 14, 2019. China has neither signed nor ratified the Rome Statute. According to Article 7 of the Rome Statute, any of the following acts may constitute a “crime against humanity”: murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation or forcible transfer of population; imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; torture; rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; enforced disappearance of persons; the crime of apartheid; and other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. See also Michael Caster, “China’s Crimes Against Humanity You’ve Never Heard Of,” *CNN*, July 26, 2018; “‘Crimes Against Humanity’ in Xinjiang Draw Attention,” *China Digital Times*, July 30, 2018.

⁴⁶Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court of July 17, 1998, entry into force July 1 2002, art. 7.

⁴⁷Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10 1948, art. 9; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23 1976, art. 9(1). See also CECC, *2014 Annual Report*, October 9, 2014, 81; United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, accessed June 16, 2019. China has signed but not ratified the ICCPR. See also Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 43/173 of December 9, 1988, principle 4. Extralegal and extrajudicial forms of detention that restrict a person’s liberty violate Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

⁴⁸Peter Martin, “How China Is Defending Its Detention of Muslims to the World,” *Bloomberg*, April 19, 2019; Gene A. Bunin, “Kyrgyz Students Vanish into Xinjiang’s Maw,” *Foreign Policy*, March 31, 2019; Nathan VanderKlippe, “‘I Felt Like a Slave’: Inside China’s Complex System of Incarceration and Control of Minorities,” *Globe and Mail*, March 31, 2019; Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Update—Detained and Disappeared: Intellectuals Under Assault in the Uyghur Homeland,” May 21, 2019; Reid Standish and Aigerim Toleukhanova, “Kazakhs Won’t Be Silenced on China’s Internment Camps,” *Foreign Policy*, March 4, 2019; “Chinese ‘Reeducation Camps’ Whistle-Blower Leaves Kazakhstan for Unnamed Country,” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, June 3, 2019.

⁴⁹Nathan VanderKlippe, “‘I Felt Like a Slave’: Inside China’s Complex System of Incarceration and Control of Minorities,” *Globe and Mail*, March 31, 2019; James Millward, “‘Reeducating’ Xinjiang’s Muslims,” *New York Review of Books*, February 7, 2019.

⁵⁰Stephanie Nebel, “1.5 Million Muslims Could Be Detained in China’s Xinjiang: Academic,” *Reuters*, March 13, 2019; Nick Cumming-Bruce, “U.S. Steps Up Criticism of China for Detentions in Xinjiang,” *New York Times*, March 13, 2019; Reid Standish and Aigerim Toleukhanova, “Kazakhs Won’t Be Silenced on China’s Internment Camps,” *Foreign Policy*, March 4, 2019; Gene A. Bunin, “Kyrgyz Students Vanish into Xinjiang’s Maw,” *Foreign Policy*, March 31, 2019; “Chinese ‘Reeducation Camps’ Whistle-Blower Leaves Kazakhstan for Unnamed Country,” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, June 3, 2019.

⁵¹See, e.g., Nathan VanderKlippe, “Inside China’s Campaign against the Uyghurs,” *Globe and Mail*, November 5, 2018; Li Zaili, “CCP Interfering with How Muslims Perform Funerals,” *Bitter Winter*, January 24, 2019; Darren Byler, “China’s Government Has Ordered a Million Citizens

to Occupy Uighur Homes. Here's What They Think They're Doing.," *ChinaFile*, Asia Society, October 24, 2018; Ruth Ingram, "Surviving China: Uyghur Voices from Xinjiang and Guantanamo," *Bitter Winter*, April 15, 2019.

⁵² See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, "China's Algorithms of Repression," May 1, 2019.

⁵³ Uyghur Human Rights Project, "Update—Detained and Disappeared: Intellectuals Under Assault in the Uyghur Homeland," May 21, 2019; Gene A. Bunin, "Kyrgyz Students Vanish into Xinjiang's Maw," *Foreign Policy*, March 31, 2019; Rémi Castets, "What's Really Happening to Uighurs in Xinjiang?," *Nation*, March 19, 2019; Kate Lyons and Lily Kuo, "Fears for Uighur Comedian Missing amid Crackdown on Cultural Figures," *Guardian*, February 21, 2019; Reid Standish and Aigerim Toleukhanova, "Kazakhs Won't Be Silenced on China's Internment Camps," *Foreign Policy*, March 4, 2019; "Chinese 'Reeducation Camps' Whistle-Blower Leaves Kazakhstan for Unnamed Country," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, June 3, 2019.

⁵⁴ See, e.g., Nathan VanderKlippe, "I Felt Like a Slave: Inside China's Complex System of Incarceration and Control of Minorities," *Globe and Mail*, March 31, 2019 ("religious extremism"); Gene A. Bunin, "Kyrgyz Students Vanish into Xinjiang's Maw," *Foreign Policy*, March 31, 2019 (previous overseas travel); Rob Schmitz, "Families of the Disappeared: A Search for Loved Ones Held in China's Xinjiang Region," *Morning Edition, NPR*, November 12, 2018 (relatives living abroad); CECC, *2018 Annual Report*, October 8, 2018, 273.

⁵⁵ Human Rights Watch, "China's Algorithms of Repression," May 1, 2019. See also Omer Kanat, "Religious Repression and Cultural Decimation: Spare a Thought for Uyghurs This Ramadan," *Global Post*, May 14, 2019.

⁵⁶ State Council Information Office, "The Fight against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang," March 2019, 20. See also "Xinhua Headlines: Preventive Approach: China's Effective Means to Combat Terrorism," *Xinhua*, March 18, 2019.

⁵⁷ Nathan VanderKlippe, "I Felt Like a Slave: Inside China's Complex System of Incarceration and Control of Minorities," *Globe and Mail*, March 31, 2019.

⁵⁸ Austin Ramzy, "'Show Me That My Father Is Alive.' China Faces Torrent of Online Pleas.," *New York Times*, February 17, 2019; Nathan VanderKlippe, "Documenting the Disappeared: Relatives, Friends Build Database of Missing Uyghurs," *Globe and Mail*, November 2, 2018.

⁵⁹ Xinjiang Victims Database (www.shahit.biz), Stats, Detention Reason, accessed August 15, 2019. As of August 15, 2019, the three reasons for detention most frequently provided in the Xinjiang Victims Database were "related to religion" (535); "related to going abroad" (324); and "relative(s)" (187). These responses were noted in the case records of 1,642 detainees for whom a reason for detention had been provided.

⁶⁰ "Mandatory Indoctrination Classes for Unemployed Uyghurs in Xinjiang," *Radio Free Asia*, February 7, 2019.

⁶¹ Peter Martin, "How China Is Defending Its Detention of Muslims to the World," *Bloomberg*, April 19, 2019.

⁶² Lily Kuo, "From Denial to Pride: How China Changed Its Language on Xinjiang's Camps," *Guardian*, October 21, 2018; Peter Martin, "How China Is Defending Its Detention of Muslims to the World," *Bloomberg*, April 19, 2019; Nectar Gan and Mimi Lau, "China Changes Law to Recognise 'Re-education Camps' in Xinjiang," *South China Morning Post*, October 13, 2018.

⁶³ "Spotlight: China Completes 3rd Universal Periodic Review at UN Human Rights Council," *Xinhua*, March 16, 2019; UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Human Rights Council Adopts the Outcomes of the Universal Periodic Review of Belize, Chad, China and Malta," March 15, 2019; Nick Cumming-Bruce, "At U.N., China Defends Mass Detention of Uighur Muslims," *New York Times*, November 6, 2018.

⁶⁴ Chris Buckley and Amy Qin, "Muslim Detention Camps Are Like 'Boarding Schools,' Chinese Official Says," *New York Times*, March 12, 2019.

⁶⁵ Cui Jia, "Xinjiang Vocational Centers 'Effective' against Extremism," *China Daily*, March 13, 2019. See also Cui Hui'ao and You Siyuan, "A Look at Vocational Education and Training Programs in Xinjiang," *CGTN*, March 13, 2019.

⁶⁶ State Council Information Office, "The Fight against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang," March 2019, 22. See also "Xinhua Headlines: Preventive Approach: China's Effective Means to Combat Terrorism," *Xinhua*, March 18, 2019.

⁶⁷ See, e.g., Peter Martin, "How China Is Defending Its Detention of Muslims to the World," *Bloomberg*, April 19, 2019; Ben Blanchard, "China Says Pace of Xinjiang 'Education' Will Slow, but Defends Camps," *Reuters*, January 6, 2019; Sophie Richardson, Human Rights Watch, "China's Xinjiang Tour Should Have Fooled No One," January 7, 2019; Karen Leigh, "China Takes Diplomats to Tour Xinjiang 'Re-Education Camps,'" *Bloomberg*, January 7, 2019.

⁶⁸ See, e.g., Peter Martin, "How China Is Defending Its Detention of Muslims to the World," *Bloomberg*, April 19, 2019.

⁶⁹ Chun Han Wong, "China Says Majority of Xinjiang Detainees Released, but Activists Question Claim," *Wall Street Journal*, July 30, 2019; "Xinjiang Situation to Realize a Soft Landing," *Global Times*, August 1, 2019; "Xinjiang Weiwu'er Zizhiqu zhuxi: jiaopei zhongxin xueyuan duoshu yi huigui shehui jiu cheng ren zhaodao lixiang jiuye" [XUAR chairman: majority of education and training students have returned to society, ninety percent have found ideal employment], *Global Times*, July 30, 2019. The Chinese term for "vocational education and training centers" is *zhiye jineng jiaoyu peixun zhongxin*.

⁷⁰ Chris Buckley and Steven Lee Myers, "China Said It Closed Muslim Detention Camps. There's Reason to Doubt That.," *New York Times*, August 9, 2019; Chris Buckley and Edward Wong, "Doubt Greets China's Claim That Muslims Have Been Released from Camps," *New York Times*, July 30, 2019; Chun Han Wong, "China Says Majority of Xinjiang Detainees Released, but Activists Question Claim," *Wall Street Journal*, July 30, 2019.

⁷¹ Chris Buckley and Edward Wong, "Doubt Greets China's Claim That Muslims Have Been Released from Camps," *New York Times*, July 30, 2019; Michael Martina, "China Says Most People in Xinjiang Camps Have 'Returned to Society,'" *Reuters*, July 30, 2019; Chun Han Wong, "China Says Majority of Xinjiang Detainees Released, but Activists Question Claim," *Wall Street*

Xinjiang

Journal, July 30, 2019; Anna Fifield, “China Celebrates ‘Very Happy Lives’ in Xinjiang, After Detaining 1 Million Uyghurs,” *Washington Post*, July 30, 2019.

⁷²Chris Buckley and Steven Lee Myers, “China Said It Closed Muslim Detention Camps. There’s Reason to Doubt That,” *New York Times*, August 9, 2019.

⁷³See, e.g., State Council Information Office, “Vocational Education and Training in Xinjiang,” August 16, 2019, 4–5.

⁷⁴Adrian Zenz, “Brainwashing, Police Guards and Coercive Internment: Evidence from Chinese Government Documents about the Nature and Extent of Xinjiang’s ‘Vocational Training Internment Camps,’” *Journal of Political Risk* 7, no. 7 (July 2019). The Chinese term for “transformation through education” is *jiaoyu zhuanhua*.

⁷⁵Sarah Cook, “The Learning Curve: How Communist Party Officials Are Applying Lessons from Prior ‘Transformation’ Campaigns to Repression in Xinjiang,” *China Brief*, Jamestown Foundation, February 1, 2019.

⁷⁶Sarah Cook, “The Learning Curve: How Communist Party Officials Are Applying Lessons from Prior ‘Transformation’ Campaigns to Repression in Xinjiang,” *China Brief*, Jamestown Foundation, February 1, 2019. See also Timothy Grose, “‘Once Their Mental State Is Healthy, They Will Be Able to Live Happily in Society,’” *ChinaFile*, Asia Society, August 2, 2019.

⁷⁷Adrian Zenz, “Xinjiang’s Re-Education and Securitization Campaign: Evidence from Domestic Security Budgets,” *China Brief*, Jamestown Foundation, November 5, 2018.

⁷⁸“Full Transcript: Interview with Xinjiang Government Chief on Counterterrorism, Vocational Education and Training in Xinjiang,” *Xinhua*, October 16, 2018; Rob Taylor, “China Supercharges Internment Camps in Xinjiang Despite International Criticism,” *Wall Street Journal*, November 1, 2018; “Slandering Xinjiang as ‘No Rights Zone’ Against Fact, Chinese Official Told UN Panel,” *Xinhua*, August 14, 2018.

⁷⁹See, e.g., Adrian Zenz, “‘Thoroughly Reforming Them Toward a Healthy Heart Attitude’—China’s Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang,” *Academia.edu* (website), updated May 15, 2018, accessed July 14, 2019, 8–14; Adrian Zenz, “New Evidence for China’s Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang,” *China Brief*, Jamestown Foundation, May 15, 2018; CECC, *2018 Annual Report*, October 8, 2018, 247, 273.

⁸⁰Adrian Zenz, “Xinjiang’s Re-Education and Securitization Campaign: Evidence from Domestic Security Budgets,” *China Brief*, Jamestown Foundation, November 5, 2018.

⁸¹Ben Dooley, “Tear Gas, Tasers and Textbooks: Inside China’s Xinjiang Internment Camps,” *Agence France-Presse*, reprinted in *Hong Kong Free Press*, October 24, 2018.

⁸²*Ibid.*

⁸³*Ibid.*

⁸⁴*ARIA in Action, Part 1: Human Rights, Democracy, and the Rule of Law, Hearing of the Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate*, 116th Cong. (2019) (testimony of Rushan Abbas, Director of Campaign for Uyghurs).

⁸⁵*Ibid.*

⁸⁶Nathan VanderKlippe, “Documenting the Disappeared: Relatives, Friends Build Database of Missing Uyghurs,” *Globe and Mail*, November 2, 2018.

⁸⁷See, e.g., Andrew McCormick, “What It’s Like to Report on Rights Abuses against Your Own Family,” *Atlantic*, March 1, 2019; Ivan Watson and Ben Westcott, “‘Cultural Genocide’: How China Is Tearing Uyghur Families Apart in Xinjiang,” *CNN*, November 15, 2018; CECC, *2018 Annual Report*, October 8, 2018, 276.

⁸⁸For more information on Abdurehim Heyit, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00371.

⁸⁹Austin Ramzy, “‘Show Me That My Father Is Alive.’ China Faces Torrent of Online Pleas,” *New York Times*, February 17, 2019; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, “QA-9 February 2019, Statement of the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hami Aksoy, in Response to a Question Regarding Serious Human Rights Violations Perpetrated against Uyghur Turks and the Passing Away of Folk Poet Abdurehim Heyit,” February 9, 2019.

⁹⁰Austin Ramzy, “‘Show Me That My Father Is Alive.’ China Faces Torrent of Online Pleas,” *New York Times*, February 17, 2019; Lily Kuo, “China Releases Video of Uyghur Poet Said to Have Died in Custody,” *Guardian*, February 11, 2019. See also Liu Caiyu, “China Refutes Turkish FM’s Accusation on Xinjiang Training Centers,” *Global Times*, February 11, 2019.

⁹¹Austin Ramzy, “‘Show Me That My Father Is Alive.’ China Faces Torrent of Online Pleas,” *New York Times*, February 17, 2019; “‘Wo ye shi Weiwu’er ren’: qinshu yaoqiu dangju gongkai shizong jiaren xialuo” [‘I’m a Uyghur too’: relatives ask authorities to disclose the whereabouts of missing family members], *Radio Free Asia*, February 12, 2019; Kate Lyons and Lily Kuo, “Fears for Uyghur Comedian Missing amid Crackdown on Cultural Figures,” *Guardian*, February 21, 2019.

⁹²Austin Ramzy, “‘Show Me That My Father Is Alive.’ China Faces Torrent of Online Pleas,” *New York Times*, February 17, 2019; Nathan VanderKlippe, “Documenting the Disappeared: Relatives, Friends Build Database of Missing Uyghurs,” *Globe and Mail*, November 2, 2018.

⁹³Philip Wen and Olzhas Auyezov, “Tracking China’s Muslim Gulag,” *Reuters*, November 29, 2018.

⁹⁴John Sudworth, “China’s Hidden Camps,” *BBC*, October 25, 2018.

⁹⁵Nathan VanderKlippe, “The Globe’s Nathan VanderKlippe Recounts Surveillance, Threats of Arrest, Destruction of Photos While Reporting in Xinjiang,” *Globe and Mail*, November 4, 2018.

⁹⁶See, e.g., Nathan VanderKlippe, “‘I Felt Like a Slave’: Inside China’s Complex System of Incarceration and Control of Minorities,” *Globe and Mail*, March 31, 2019; Flint Duxfield and Ian Burrows, “Uyghur Woman Details Life Inside Chinese ‘Re-education Camp’ in Xinjiang,” *Australian Broadcasting Corporation*, January 8, 2019; Reid Standish, “China’s Expanding War on Islam: Now They’re Coming for the Kazakhs,” *Washington Post*, March 1, 2019.

Xinjiang

⁹⁷Reid Standish, “China’s Expanding War on Islam: Now They’re Coming for the Kazakhs,” *Washington Post*, March 1, 2019. See also Nathan VanderKlippe, “‘I Felt Like a Slave’: Inside China’s Complex System of Incarceration and Control of Minorities,” *Globe and Mail*, March 31, 2019.

⁹⁸Reid Standish, “China’s Expanding War on Islam: Now They’re Coming for the Kazakhs,” *Washington Post*, March 1, 2019. See also Nathan VanderKlippe, “‘I Felt Like a Slave’: Inside China’s Complex System of Incarceration and Control of Minorities,” *Globe and Mail*, March 31, 2019.

⁹⁹Amy Gunia, “State Department Official Says U.S. Residents May Be Among the Muslims Detained in Xinjiang,” *Time*, March 29, 2019; Michelle Kosinski and Jennifer Hansler, “State Dept. Believes US Legal Residents are Being Held in Chinese Detention Camps,” *CNN*, March 29, 2019; Tara Francis Chan, “U.S. Resident May Be One of a Million People Imprisoned in China’s Secretive Detention Camps,” *Newsweek*, March 29, 2019.

¹⁰⁰“‘Deeply Concerned’ Marise Payne to Pursue China Over Detention of Million Uighurs,” *SBS News*, July 15, 2019; Paul Karp, “Australia ‘Deeply Concerned’ About China’s Treatment of Uighur People,” *Guardian*, July 14, 2019. See also Vicky Xiuzhong Xu and Jamie Tarabay, “In Australia, Muslims Call for Pressure on China Over Missing Relatives,” *New York Times*, April 13, 2019; Kate Lyons, “Revealed: 17 Australian Residents Believed Detained in China’s Uighur Crackdown,” *Guardian*, February 11, 2019.

¹⁰¹Kate Lyons, “Revealed: Five Australian Children Trapped in China amid Uighur Crackdown,” *Guardian*, April 5, 2019.

¹⁰²Fergus Ryan, Danielle Cave, and Nathan Ruser, “Mapping Xinjiang’s ‘Re-education’ Camps,” International Cyber Policy Centre, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, November 1, 2018.

¹⁰³Ibid.

¹⁰⁴Ibid.

¹⁰⁵Philip Wen and Olzhas Auyezov, “Tracking China’s Muslim Gulag,” *Reuters*, November 29, 2018.

¹⁰⁶John Sudworth, “China’s Hidden Camps,” *BBC*, October 25, 2018.

¹⁰⁷Adrian Zenz, “Beyond the Camps: Beijing’s Grand Scheme of Forced Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang,” SocArXiv, July 14, 2019, 1, 6.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., 5–7.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., 8–9.

¹¹⁰Ibid., 18–19.

¹¹¹Ibid., 12.

¹¹²Martha Mendoza and Yanan Wang, “US Reviews Report of Imports from Forced Labor in China Camp,” *Associated Press*, December 19, 2018.

¹¹³“Businesses in China’s Xinjiang Use Forced Labor Linked to Camp System,” *Radio Free Asia*, January 1, 2019.

¹¹⁴See, e.g., “China Secretly Transferring Uyghur Detainees from Xinjiang to Shaanxi, Gansu Province Prisons,” *Radio Free Asia*, February 8, 2019.

¹¹⁵“As Many as 1,200 Uyghur Detainees Held in Gansu Prison after Secret Transfer from Xinjiang,” *Radio Free Asia*, April 12, 2019; “China Secretly Transferring Uyghur Detainees from Xinjiang to Shaanxi, Gansu Province Prisons,” *Radio Free Asia*, February 8, 2019.

¹¹⁶“Xinjiang Authorities Secretly Transferring Uyghur Detainees to Jails Throughout China,” *Radio Free Asia*, October 2, 2018; “China Secretly Transferring Uyghur Detainees from Xinjiang to Shaanxi, Gansu Province Prisons,” *Radio Free Asia*, February 8, 2019.

¹¹⁷“Xinjiang da guimo zhuanyi Musilin jizhongying qian Gansu” [Large-scale transfer of Muslims in Xinjiang, concentration camps moved to Gansu], *Radio Free Asia*, October 1, 2018; “As Many as 1,200 Uyghur Detainees Held in Gansu Prison after Secret Transfer from Xinjiang,” *Radio Free Asia*, April 12, 2019; “China Secretly Transferring Uyghur Detainees from Xinjiang to Shaanxi, Gansu Province Prisons,” *Radio Free Asia*, February 8, 2019.

¹¹⁸“China Secretly Transferring Uyghur Detainees from Xinjiang to Shaanxi, Gansu Province Prisons,” *Radio Free Asia*, February 8, 2019; “As Many as 1,200 Uyghur Detainees Held in Gansu Prison after Secret Transfer from Xinjiang,” *Radio Free Asia*, April 12, 2019.

¹¹⁹“China Spiriting Uyghur Detainees Away from Xinjiang to Prisons in Inner Mongolia, Sichuan,” *Radio Free Asia*, February 21, 2019.

¹²⁰“As Many as 1,200 Uyghur Detainees Held in Gansu Prison after Secret Transfer from Xinjiang,” *Radio Free Asia*, April 12, 2019.

¹²¹“China Spiriting Uyghur Detainees Away from Xinjiang to Prisons in Inner Mongolia, Sichuan,” *Radio Free Asia*, February 21, 2019.

¹²²“Xinjiang Authorities Secretly Transferring Uyghur Detainees to Jails Throughout China,” *Radio Free Asia*, October 2, 2018; “Xinjiang da guimo zhuanyi Musilin jizhongying qian Gansu” [Large-scale transfer of Muslims in Xinjiang, concentration camps moved to Gansu], *Radio Free Asia*, October 1, 2018.

¹²³Wang Yanhong, “Xinjiang tielu zanting fashou 10 yue 22 ri ji yihou chepiao” [Xinjiang trains to suspend ticket sales for trains beginning October 22], *Urumqi Evening News*, reprinted in *People’s Daily*, September 27, 2018; “Shifou you you da shi fasheng? Xinjiang tielu zan ting shoupiao” [Is something big happening again? Xinjiang trains temporarily suspend ticket sales], *Deutsche Welle*, September 26, 2018.

¹²⁴Holly Robertson, “China Reportedly Begins Mass Transfers of Uighur Detainees from Xinjiang to Prisons Nationwide,” *Australian Broadcasting Company*, October 9, 2018.

¹²⁵CECC, *2018 Annual Report*, October 8, 2018, 276.

¹²⁶Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Update—Detained and Disappeared: Intellectuals Under Assault in the Uyghur Homeland,” May 21, 2019.

¹²⁷Henryk Szadziewski, “Disappeared Forever?,” *China Channel, Los Angeles Review of Books*, February 21, 2019. See also Magnus Fiskesjö, “China’s Thousandfold Guantánamos,” *Inside Higher Ed*, April 8, 2019.

Xinjiang

¹²⁸ Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Update—Detained and Disappeared: Intellectuals Under Assault in the Uyghur Homeland,” May 21, 2019.

¹²⁹ Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Update—Detained and Disappeared: Intellectuals Under Assault in the Uyghur Homeland,” May 21, 2019; Darren Byler, “‘As If You’ve Spent Your Whole Life in Prison’: Starving and Subdued in Xinjiang Detention Centers,” *SupChina*, December 5, 2018.

¹³⁰ For more information on Tashpolat Teyip, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2019-00064.

¹³¹ For more information on Sanubar Tursun, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2019-00071.

¹³² Amy Anderson, “A Death Sentence for a Life of Service,” *Art of Life in Central Asia*, January 22, 2019; “Three Uyghur Intellectuals Jailed for Separatism, Political Study Film Reveals,” *Radio Free Asia*, October 10, 2018.

¹³³ Amy Anderson, “A Death Sentence for a Life of Service,” *Art of Life in Central Asia*, January 22, 2019; “Three Uyghur Intellectuals Jailed for Separatism, Political Study Film Reveals,” *Radio Free Asia*, October 10, 2018. Authorities use the term “two-faced” to describe ethnic minority individuals who they say appear to support the Chinese Communist Party, but privately disagree with official policies towards ethnic minorities. “Uyghur Police Commissar Said Detained Since June 2018,” *Radio Free Asia*, August 20, 2019.

¹³⁴ Rachel Harris, “China: Sanubar Tursun, Voice of the Uyghurs, Missing Presumed Detained in Xinjiang’s Internment Camps,” *Freemuse*, February 8, 2019. See also Gregory Lee, “Concern Over Sanubar Tursun: Uyghur Cultural Icon’s Concerts Cancelled in France,” *MediaPart, La longue marche de Gregory Lee* (blog), January 31, 2019.

¹³⁵ Gregory Lee, “Concern Over Sanubar Tursun: Uyghur Cultural Icon’s Concerts Cancelled in France,” *MediaPart, La longue marche de Gregory Lee* (blog), January 31, 2019. See also Rachel Harris, “China: Sanubar Tursun, Voice of the Uyghurs, Missing Presumed Detained in Xinjiang’s Internment Camps,” *Freemuse*, February 8, 2019.

¹³⁶ “Chinese Authorities Arrest Xinjiang Intellectual amid Crackdown on Prominent Uyghurs,” *Radio Free Asia*, January 12, 2018; “Prominent Uyghur Intellectual Given Two-Year Suspended Death Sentence for ‘Separatism,’” *Radio Free Asia*, September 28, 2018. For more information on Halmurat Ghopur, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2019-00041.

¹³⁷ “Popular Uyghur Comedian Disappears, Believed Detained,” *Radio Free Asia*, December 21, 2018; Kate Lyons and Lily Kuo, “Fears for Uighur Comedian Missing amid Crackdown on Cultural Figures,” *Guardian*, February 21, 2019; Sheena Goodyear, “Family Fears Missing Uighur Comedian Taken to Chinese Detention Camp,” *Canadian Broadcasting Corporation*, December 31, 2018. For more information on Adil Mijit, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2019-00090.

¹³⁸ Rachel Harris, “China: Uyghur Pop Idol Zahirshah Ablimit Detained in Xinjiang,” *Freemuse*, January 24, 2019.

¹³⁹ “Authorities Detain Senior Editors of Uyghur Publishing House over ‘Problematic’ Books,” *Radio Free Asia*, November 12, 2018. For more information on Qurban Mamut, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2019-00191.

¹⁴⁰ “Three Uyghur Intellectuals Jailed for Separatism, Political Study Film Reveals,” *Radio Free Asia*, October 10, 2018.

¹⁴¹ Leigh Hartman, “China Targets Intellectuals in Bid to Eradicate Uighur Culture,” *ShareAmerica*, U.S. Department of State, March 21, 2019.

¹⁴² “Cong lao Danguyan dao fenlie fenzi, Weiwu’er xuezheng kong yi ‘shandian zui’ bei panxing” [From old Party member to separatist, Uyghur scholar feared to have been sentenced for “inciting subversion of state power”], *Voice of America*, February 20, 2019.

¹⁴³ Reid Standish, “China’s Expanding War on Islam: Now They’re Coming for the Kazakhs.,” *Washington Post*, March 1, 2019; Reid Standish and Aigerim Toleukhanova, “Kazakhs Won’t Be Silenced on China’s Internment Camps,” *Foreign Policy*, March 4, 2019.

¹⁴⁴ Flint Duxfield and Ian Burrows, “Uyghur Woman Details Life Inside Chinese ‘Re-education Camp’ in Xinjiang,” *Australian Broadcasting Corporation*, January 8, 2019; Isabel van Brugen, “Prisoners Tortured, Drugged, Killed by Injection in Xinjiang ‘Re-Education Camps,’ Ex-Inmate Reveals,” *Epoch Times*, December 13, 2018; Darren Byler, “‘As If You’ve Spent Your Whole Life in Prison’: Starving and Subdued in Xinjiang Detention Centers,” *SupChina*, December 5, 2018. For more information on Gulbahar Jelilova, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2019-00032.

¹⁴⁵ Flint Duxfield and Ian Burrows, “Uyghur Woman Details Life Inside Chinese ‘Re-education Camp’ in Xinjiang,” *Australian Broadcasting Corporation*, January 8, 2019; Isabel van Brugen, “Prisoners Tortured, Drugged, Killed by Injection in Xinjiang ‘Re-Education Camps,’ Ex-Inmate Reveals,” *Epoch Times*, December 13, 2018; Darren Byler, “‘As If You’ve Spent Your Whole Life in Prison’: Starving and Subdued in Xinjiang Detention Centers,” *SupChina*, December 5, 2018.

¹⁴⁶ Reid Standish and Aigerim Toleukhanova, “Kazakhs Won’t Be Silenced on China’s Internment Camps,” *Foreign Policy*, March 4, 2019; Dake Kang, “China Allowing 2,000 Ethnic Kazakhs to Leave Xinjiang Region,” *Associated Press*, January 9, 2019.

¹⁴⁷ Reid Standish and Aigerim Toleukhanova, “Kazakhs Won’t Be Silenced on China’s Internment Camps,” *Foreign Policy*, March 4, 2019. It was unclear if the 20 Kazakh citizens released mentioned in this report were among the 2,500 ethnic Kazakhs whom Chinese officials had agreed to release to Kazakhstan.

¹⁴⁸ Reid Standish, “She Fled China’s Camps—But She’s Still Not Free,” *Foreign Policy*, February 6, 2019; Nathan VanderKlippe, “‘I Felt Like a Slave’: Inside China’s Complex System of Incarceration and Control of Minorities,” *Globe and Mail*, March 31, 2019; Kate De Pury, “Woman Who Told of Chinese Internment Camps Headed to Sweden,” *Associated Press*, June 3, 2019.

Xinjiang

¹⁴⁹Kate De Pury, “Woman Who Told of Chinese Internment Camps Headed to Sweden,” *Associated Press*, June 3, 2019; “Chinese ‘Reeducation Camps’ Whistle-Blower Leaves Kazakhstan for Unnamed Country,” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, June 3, 2019.

¹⁵⁰Reid Standish and Aigerim Toleukhanova, “Kazakhs Won’t Be Silenced on China’s Internment Camps,” *Foreign Policy*, March 4, 2019; Austin Ramzy, “Critic Who Exposed China’s Muslim Camps Is Detained, Even Across the Border,” *New York Times*, March 13, 2019.

¹⁵¹Austin Ramzy, “Critic Who Exposed China’s Muslim Camps Is Detained, Even across the Border,” *New York Times*, March 13, 2019.

¹⁵²Austin Ramzy, “Critic of China’s Detention Camps Is Free, but Silence May Be the Price,” *New York Times*, August 17, 2019.

¹⁵³Gene A. Bunin, “Kyrgyz Students Vanish into Xinjiang’s Maw,” *Foreign Policy*, March 31, 2019; Tolkun Namtbayeva and Christopher Rickleton, “Central Asians Cry Out over China’s Secret Detention Camps,” *Agence France-Presse*, reprinted in *Yahoo! News*, December 18, 2018.

¹⁵⁴Adrian Zenz, “Break Their Roots: Evidence for China’s Parent-Child Separation Campaign in Xinjiang,” *Journal of Political Risk* 7, no. 7 (July 2019); Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Universal Children’s Day 2018: China Must Reunite Uyghur Children and Parents. Forcible Placement of Children of Living Parents in State-Run Facilities Constitutes a Crime Against Humanity,” November 19, 2018; Emily Feng, “Uighur Children Fall Victim to China Anti-Terror Drive,” *Financial Times*, July 9, 2018.

¹⁵⁵Adrian Zenz, “Break Their Roots: Evidence for China’s Parent-Child Separation Campaign in Xinjiang,” *Journal of Political Risk* 7, no. 7 (July 2019).

¹⁵⁶Adrian Zenz, “Break Their Roots: Evidence for China’s Parent-Child Separation Campaign in Xinjiang,” *Journal of Political Risk* 7, no. 7 (July 2019); Adrian Zenz, “Beyond the Camps: Beijing’s Grand Scheme of Forced Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang,” *SocArXiv*, July 14, 2019, 1, 2, 4, 17–18.

¹⁵⁷Yanan Wang and Dake Kang, “China Treats Uighur Kids as ‘Orphans’ After Parents Seized,” *Associated Press*, September 21, 2018.

¹⁵⁸Emily Feng, “Uighur Children Fall Victim to China Anti-Terror Drive,” *Financial Times*, July 9, 2018.

¹⁵⁹Yanan Wang and Dake Kang, “China Treats Uighur Kids as ‘Orphans’ After Parents Seized,” *Associated Press*, September 21, 2018.

¹⁶⁰Megha Rajagopalan and K. Murat Yildiz, “China Has Also Been Targeting Foreigners in Its Brutal Crackdown on Muslims,” *BuzzFeed News*, March 27, 2019; “Interview: I Have Never Cried so Much in My Life,” *Radio Free Asia*, March 5, 2019; Yanan Wang and Dake Kang, “China Treats Uighur Kids as ‘Orphans’ After Parents Seized,” *Associated Press*, September 21, 2018; Yanan Wang and Dake Kang, “Empty Places at the Table: Uighur Children Missing in China,” *Associated Press*, September 21, 2018.

¹⁶¹Yanan Wang and Dake Kang, “China Treats Uighur Kids as ‘Orphans’ After Parents Seized,” *Associated Press*, September 21, 2018.

¹⁶²Sigal Samuel, “China’s Jaw-Dropping Family Separation Policy,” *Atlantic*, September 4, 2018.

¹⁶³“Uyghur Children’s Identities Changed,” *Radio Free Asia*, May 22, 2009.

¹⁶⁴Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Universal Children’s Day 2018: China Must Reunite Uyghur Children and Parents. Forcible Placement of Children of Living Parents in State-Run Facilities Constitutes a Crime Against Humanity,” November 19, 2018.

¹⁶⁵Darren Byler, “China’s Government Has Ordered a Million Citizens to Occupy Uighur Homes. Here’s What They Think They’re Doing,” *ChinaFile*, Asia Society, October 24, 2018. See also CECC, *2018 Annual Report*, October 10, 2018, 279.

¹⁶⁶Ji Yuqiao, “1.1 Million Civil Servants in Xinjiang Pair Up with Ethnic Minority Residents to Improve Unity,” *Global Times*, November 7, 2018; Yang Mingfang, Li Ya’nan, and A’erdake, “Qinqing yangyi nuan Tianshan” [Family-friendly and warm Tianshan], *People’s Daily*, November 7, 2018 (*jiedui renqin*); Shang Lucun, Guo Mengchen, and Cheng Shucheng, “Tianshan xuesong gen lian gen minzu tuanjie xin lian xin Xinjiang Gong’an Ting Kexin Zongdui nanjiang qianli jieqin” [The roots of Tianshan cedars link together, ethnic unity links hearts together, Xinjiang PSB Science and Technology Corps links relatives together across thousands of miles in southern Xinjiang], *Northwest Energy Net*, November 4, 2016, reprinted in *China News Agency*, July 6, 2017 (*jiedui bangfu*); Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, “Xinjiang guanbi shaoshu minzu xuexiao Xinyuan Si Zhong biangeng wei zhengzhi xuexi jidi” [Xinjiang closes ethnic minority schools, Xinyuan No. 4 High School changed into political study base], April 4, 2018 (*jiedui fubang*).

¹⁶⁷Rob Schmitz, “A Woman Tells Her Story of Forced Abortion and Escape from China’s Repression,” *Morning Edition, NPR*, November 14, 2018.

¹⁶⁸Darren Byler, “China’s Government Has Ordered a Million Citizens to Occupy Uighur Homes. Here’s What They Think They’re Doing,” *ChinaFile*, Asia Society, October 24, 2018.

¹⁶⁹Ibid.

¹⁷⁰Ibid.

¹⁷¹Ibid.

¹⁷²See CECC, *2018 Annual Report*, October 10, 2018, 277–78.

¹⁷³Human Rights Watch, “China’s Algorithms of Repression,” May 1, 2019. Activities monitored by the IJOP system that authorities consider “abnormal” (*feizhengchang*) reportedly include the use of more electricity than “normal” and a relationship to a person who has obtained a new phone number.

¹⁷⁴Yanan Wang and Dake Kang, “Exposed Chinese Database Shows Depth of Surveillance State,” *Associated Press*, February 19, 2019.

¹⁷⁵Victor Gevers (@0xDUDE), “So this insecure face recognition/personal verification solution . . .,” Twitter, February 14, 2019, 12:30 p.m. See also Chris Baynes, “Chinese ‘Muslim Tracker’ Surveillance System Monitoring Movements of 2.5m People in Xinjiang,” *Independent*, February 19, 2019.

Xinjiang

¹⁷⁶Li Tao, “SenseNets: The Facial Recognition Company That Supplies China’s Skynet Surveillance System,” *South China Morning Post*, April 12, 2019; David Ramli and Mark Bergen, “This Company Is Helping Build China’s Panopticon. It Won’t Stop There,” *Bloomberg*, November 19, 2018; Christian Shepherd, “China’s SenseTime Sells Out of Xinjiang Security Joint Venture,” *Financial Times*, April 15, 2019. SenseTime sold its stake in SenseNets in July 2018.

¹⁷⁷John Ruwitch, “Chinese Official Says ‘Sinicization’ of Religion in Xinjiang Must Go On,” *Reuters*, October 13, 2018; “Xinjiang Promotes Policy Awareness for Religions,” *Global Times*, April 2, 2019; “You Quan: dali cujan minzu tuanjie he zongjiao hexie nuli shixian Xinjiang shehui wending he changzhi jiu’an” [You Quan: vigorously promote national unity and religious harmony, strive to achieve social stability and long-term security in Xinjiang], *Xinhua*, October 13, 2018. See also Li Qingqing, “China Explores Effective Governance of Religion in Secular World,” *Global Times*, January 6, 2019.

¹⁷⁸See, e.g., Lily Kuo, “Revealed: New Evidence of China’s Mission to Raze the Mosques of Xinjiang,” *Guardian*, May 6, 2019; State Council Information Office, “The Fight against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang,” March 2019, 20; John Ruwitch, “Chinese Official Says ‘Sinicization’ of Religion in Xinjiang Must Go On,” *Reuters*, October 13, 2018.

¹⁷⁹Li Zaili, “CCP Interfering with How Muslims Perform Funerals,” *Bitter Winter*, January 24, 2019; James Millward, “‘Reeducating’ Xinjiang’s Muslims,” *New York Review of Books*, February 7, 2019.

¹⁸⁰Ruth Ingram, “‘Surviving China’: Uyghur Voices from Xinjiang and Guantanamo,” *Bitter Winter*, April 15, 2019; Leigh Hartman, “China’s Repression of Muslims in Xinjiang,” *ShareAmerica*, U.S. Department of State, February 14, 2019. See also Farida Deif, “A Missed Opportunity to Protect Muslims in China,” *New Arab*, March 21, 2019.

¹⁸¹Darren Byler, “China’s Government Has Ordered a Million Citizens to Occupy Uighur Homes. Here’s What They Think They’re Doing,” *ChinaFile*, Asia Society, October 24, 2018; Nathan VanderKlippe, “Inside China’s Campaign against the Uyghurs,” *Globe and Mail*, November 5, 2018; James Millward, “‘Reeducating’ Xinjiang’s Muslims,” *New York Review of Books*, February 7, 2019; Timothy Grose, “China’s Mass Incarceration of Muslims Cannot Be Left Unchallenged,” *Guardian*, November 13, 2018. “Assalamu alaykum” is an Arabic-language greeting meaning “peace be upon you.”

¹⁸²Darren Byler, “The Future of Uyghur Cultural—and Halal—Life in the Year of the Pig,” *SupChina*, February 6, 2019; “Xinjiang’s Kashgar University Students, Teachers Forced to Give Up Muslim Dietary Restrictions,” *Radio Free Asia*, November 6, 2018; “China Launches Anti-Halal Crackdown in Xinjiang City,” *Agence France-Presse*, reprinted in *Hong Kong Free Press*, October 11, 2018; Liu Caiyu, “Officers, Party Members Urged to Strengthen Faith,” *Global Times*, October 9, 2018.

¹⁸³“Chinese Officials Force Muslims to Drink, Eat Pork at Festival,” *Radio Free Asia*, February 6, 2019; “Xinjiang’s Kashgar University Students, Teachers Forced to Give Up Muslim Dietary Restrictions,” *Radio Free Asia*, November 6, 2018; Darren Byler, “The Future of Uyghur Cultural—and Halal—Life in the Year of the Pig,” *SupChina*, February 6, 2019; Reid Standish, “China’s Expanding War on Islam: Now They’re Coming for the Kazakhs,” *Washington Post*, March 1, 2019.

¹⁸⁴Nathan VanderKlippe, “Inside China’s Campaign against the Uyghurs,” *Globe and Mail*, November 5, 2018.

¹⁸⁵Lily Kuo, “Revealed: New Evidence of China’s Mission to Raze the Mosques of Xinjiang,” *Guardian*, May 6, 2019.

¹⁸⁶Lily Kuo, “Revealed: New Evidence of China’s Mission to Raze the Mosques of Xinjiang,” *Guardian*, May 6, 2019; Shawn Zhang, “Clarification of Keriya Etika Mosque’s Current Situation,” *Medium* (blog), April 23, 2019; Nick Waters, “Are Historic Mosques in Xinjiang Being Destroyed?” *Bellingcat*, April 5, 2019; “Keriye Héytagh Jamesining shimaliy ishikining chéqiwétilgenliki ilgiri sürüldi” [Source claims north gate of Keriye Heytgh Mosque has been demolished], *Radio Free Asia*, April 24, 2019. Some reports have referred to the Keriya Heytgh Mosque as the Keriya Etika Mosque or the Yutian Aitika Mosque.

¹⁸⁷Joanne Smith Finley, “Now We Don’t Talk Anymore,” *ChinaFile*, Asia Society, December 28, 2018; Nathan VanderKlippe, “Inside China’s Campaign against the Uyghurs,” *Globe and Mail*, November 5, 2018; Josh Chin and Clément Bürge, “After Mass Detentions, China Razes Muslim Communities to Build a Loyal City,” *Wall Street Journal*, March 20, 2019.

¹⁸⁸Mark Doman, Stephen Hutcheon, Dylan Welch, and Kyle Taylor, “China’s Frontier of Fear,” *Australian Broadcasting Corporation*, November 1, 2018.

¹⁸⁹Nathan VanderKlippe, “Inside China’s Campaign against the Uyghurs,” *Globe and Mail*, November 5, 2018.

¹⁹⁰Interview: “They Detained Her Because She Had Studied Islam in a Foreign Country,” *Radio Free Asia*, October 3, 2018. For more information on Muýesser Muhemmet, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00626.

¹⁹¹Li Zaili, “15 Years in Prison for a Social Media Post,” *Bitter Winter*, October 6, 2018.

¹⁹²“Xinjiang Authorities Sentence Uyghur Philanthropist to Death for Unsanctioned Hajj,” *Radio Free Asia*, November 21, 2018. For more information on Abdughappar Abdurusul, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00645.

¹⁹³For information on official religious restrictions enforced during Ramadan in previous reporting years, see, e.g., CECC, *2018 Annual Report*, October 10, 2018, 279, 281; CECC, *2017 Annual Report*, October 5, 2017, 287; CECC, *2016 Annual Report*, October 6, 2016, 287.

¹⁹⁴Eva Xiao and Pak Yiu, “Wrecked Mosques, Police Watch: A Tense Ramadan in Xinjiang,” *Agence France-Presse*, reprinted in *Yahoo! News*, June 5, 2019; Sophia Yan, “China’s Uighur Muslims Forced to Eat and Drink as Ramadan Celebrations Banned,” *Telegraph*, June 1, 2019.

¹⁹⁵Rebecca Asoulin and Ann Scott Tyson, “Reporting in Xinjiang: ‘A War Zone With No War,’” *Christian Science Monitor*, May 8, 2019; Sophia Yan, “China’s Uighur Muslims Forced to Eat

Xinjiang

and Drink as Ramadan Celebrations Banned,” *Telegraph*, June 1, 2019; Darren Byler, “Empty Uyghur Mosques During Ramadan in China,” *Milestones*, May 18, 2019.

¹⁹⁶ Eva Xiao and Pak Yiu, “Wrecked Mosques, Police Watch: A Tense Ramadan in Xinjiang,” *Agence France-Presse*, reprinted in *Yahoo! News*, June 5, 2019; Sophia Yan, “China’s Uighur Muslims Forced to Eat and Drink as Ramadan Celebrations Banned,” *Telegraph*, June 1, 2019.

¹⁹⁷ Sophia Yan, “China’s Uighur Muslims Forced to Eat and Drink as Ramadan Celebrations Banned,” *Telegraph*, June 1, 2019; Rikar Hussein, “Diplomat Confirms Limits on Ramadan in Xinjiang,” *Voice of America*, May 16, 2019.

¹⁹⁸ Sophia Yan, “China’s Uighur Muslims Forced to Eat and Drink as Ramadan Celebrations Banned,” *Telegraph*, June 1, 2019; Rikar Hussein, “Diplomat Confirms Limits on Ramadan in Xinjiang,” *Voice of America*, May 16, 2019.